

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XXI. No. 3.] LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 18, 1812.

[Price 1s.]

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES. — The dispute, which has been so long going on with America, does, at last, appear to be drawing to a close. Before I come to what has passed in *Parliament* upon the subject, I must notice what has passed on the other side of the water. — The *Report of the Committee of the Lower House of Congress*, which I shall endeavour to get into the present Number, is, in fact, a *Manifesto* against England. It belongs to the representatives of the people to declare war in America, because the people there think, that, as they are to bear all the burden of the war, war ought not to be entered upon without their approbation. In this Report, therefore, *the people speak*; for the Congress are their *real* representatives; and the language of the people is plainly this: *A Repeal of the English Orders in Council; or, a War with England.* — It would be quite useless to attempt a revival of the discussion relative to these Orders, or to the revocation of the French Decrees. That discussion is at an end. The Americans say, that the Orders ought to be repealed, and we refuse to repeal them; and they now say, that we shall repeal them, or that we shall have them amongst our enemies. — Now, then, shall we repeal them, or shall we not? Shall we, after all, give way? Shall we, after all our vaunts and all our threats, yield at the name of war? Shall we, who can conquer 30 millions of people in five days, retract our determinations at the menace of ten millions? And, shall we do it, too, in consequence of a *Manifesto*, in which, according to the interpretation of the *Times News-paper*, our court is called a *corrupted court*? Shall we yield, at last, upon terms like these? — My opinion is, *that we shall*. Aye, hard as the thing may be to get down, my opinion is, that we shall swallow it. — Why do I think so? Simply because, since the *Manifesto* has arrived in England, I have perceived these prints, which amongst the most venal (*The Times* and *The Courier*), and which have all along decidedly

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contended *against* the repeal, beginning to *retract*; beginning that operation, which is usually termed *backing-out*; or more significantly, *drawing in of the horns*; and these are signs, which, if properly attended to, will always lead one to pretty correct conclusions. — But the manner of their backing-out is well worthy of attention. It is a curious specimen of performance, and merits being recorded. It appeared first in the *Courier* of the 6th instant, in the following words: "There is no foundation whatever for the assertion so insolently made by the Americans, that the British Government insist, as a preliminary to the repeal of our Orders in Council, not only upon the revocation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, but that America should also compel France to receive British goods through Neutral vessels. No such pretension has been urged by Mr. Foster; and all that we had demanded, has been and is, a *bonâ fide* and an official revocation of the Decrees of Berlin and Milan without any conditions injurious to the maritime rights of Great Britain. Let France repeal her Decrees with the same formality which she has employed in promulgating them, and a fair reference to the correspondence of Mr. Foster will prove that our Orders in Council will no longer be continued. This principle is most distinctly stated in Marquis Wellesley's last note to Mr. Pinckney, which the American Government have not published, but which will very shortly appear. — I shall be glad to see *any thing* most distinctly stated" in Marquis Wellesley's last letter to Mr. Pinckney; for, I am not ashamed to confess frankly, that, in the letter of the Marquis to Mr. Pinckney, which I have seen, I saw very little, of which, unused as I am to such profound pieces of composition, I could make top or tail of. Mr. Foster seems, in point of profundity, to be a worthy representative of his principal; for, I really do not comprehend much of what he says, in his letters to Mr. Monroe, though I have taken no small pains to make myself fully acquainted with their meaning. — How-

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ever, as far as I was able to dive, I gathered that they meant, that, before England repealed her Orders, Buonaparté must put the revocation of his Decrees into full practice; and also *that he must restore commerce to the footing that it was on before the passing of those Decrees; that is to say, that he must admit the merchandise of England into the continent, in neutral vessels, in the same way that it was admitted into the continent, in those vessels, before the passing of the Decrees.* Now, it is very well known, that, since the Decrees were passed, the continental system has begun; consequently, the fair, and, indeed, the only, sense of our declaration was, that the continental system should be done away before we would repeal our Orders; and as the continental system is neither more nor less than a prohibition of the entrance of English and colonial goods, in neutral ships, the Orders, of course were not to be repealed, till English and colonial goods were again admitted into those parts of the continent that are now under the dominion or controul of Buonaparté.—This was the way in which I understood our declarations; this is the meaning which I, in October 1810, gave to Lord Wellesley's first letter to Mr. Pinckney which was then published in England; this is the meaning which Mr. Pinckney gave to the first and second letter of Lord Wellesley; this is the meaning which Mr. Monroe has given to the subsequent letters of Mr. Foster; this is the meaning which Mr. Madison has given to them; and this is the meaning which the Congress has now, in their manifesto, given to them. How, then! Can all these people have been deceived? Faith, the meaning must have lain very deep! It is the object of most men to make themselves understood; but, if this meaning has been so completely mistaken all this while, one would think that the object was not to have it clearly understood.—But, then again, it is very unfortunate, that not a word, in any of the subsequent letters, appears to have been said to remove the misunderstanding. The American ministers have been continually complaining of this pretension, from August 1810 to November 1811; they have descanted, at great length, upon the monstrosity of saying that you will continue to make war upon *their* commerce, unless Buonaparté will admit *our* goods; and, no one has ever, that I can perceive, taken the smallest pains to explain that no such thing was meant. Is

not this very odd? If I were to write to a person demanding by mistake ten pounds of him when he owed me five, and he were to complain of my injustice, should I not hasten to correct the mistake? If I were understood by him to demand more than my words expressed, and he were to complain, should I let the thing swell up to a quarrel, before I explained my words? Is this according to the common practice of men? Is it not too far out of nature to be probable; nay, to be possible?—Yet, as if this were not enough, these very venal writers understood our declaration in precisely the same sense that the Americans have understood it; and, what is more, the Times and the Courier have, until the Manifesto came out, actually been labouring to defend the doctrine of that very declaration; and they have broadly insisted, that our government would do wrong to repeal the Orders, unless Buonaparté first did away the Continental system! Surely any thing so shameless as this was never before witnessed.—It was not 'till the Report, "the fiery Report," as they call it; it was not 'till that came, that these good men discovered, that our declaration had no such meaning as that which the Americans had given it; and, they have the conscience to say, that the Americans are "insolent" for having given to it that very meaning which they themselves had given to it, and under which meaning they themselves had defended it.—Who, however, has not met with something of this sort in the world? Who has not seen a pretension abandoned, and the party abandoning it affect to be *angry* with the party against whom it was erected, for having misinterpreted his meaning? We have all seen this; and we all know, that it is one of the most pitiful shifts of those who dare not persevere, and who are too proud openly to retract; and these venal writers may be well assured, that, however successful they may be in deceiving, by such means, the people of England, they will not deceive, nor will any body for them deceive, one single soul in America.—However, the Americans will not care what is said about the pretension ever having been set up, provided it be not now persevered in. They will laugh, I dare say, at the manner in which these prints *back-out*; though they will be content to get what they want, without insisting upon a confession of error. But, they must have what they want. They will say, that the best way of removing all ground for

misunderstanding is to do away the Orders in Council; and that they must now have, or they will treat us to a war.—These wise-
 acres say, that the Orders will be repealed, when Napoleon revokes the Decrees "*with the same formality that he employed in promulgating them.*" Here they foolishly make new disgrace for themselves; for he will, I dare say, do no such thing. The Americans say, that he *has* revoked them to their satisfaction. They will not call upon him to issue any proclamations or edicts. *They* are perfectly satisfied with what he has done; and, therefore, this new pretension is a very foolish thing; it is keeping just the ends of the horns projecting. When the wise men were at it, they would have done well to draw them in out of sight. For, draw them in they must, or there is a war with America.—Some people imagine, and, indeed, the venal prints say, that this Report of the Congress is only another of those *blustering threats*, which we have so often heard from the same quarter. Did they ever hear of any thing like this *before* from that quarter? I am sure they did not. It is the language of determination; and, as was observed in my letters to the Prince Regent, it is a determination of *the people* and not merely of the government. I was very anxious to impress this upon his mind; I was, as I told him, very anxious to guard him against the flatteries of the parasites of the press, who were labouring hard to make him and the public believe, that the *people* of America were on our side; that Mr. Madison's reputation, had been destroyed by the publications of Mr. Smith; and that nothing would induce the people to consent to a war against us. I besought the Prince to beware of such opinions; I told him how false they were but I did not describe them as being more false than they are now proved to have been. I had much better intelligence than these writers had; I suspect, rather better than the ministers themselves possessed. About six months after I was in this jail, I received a letter from the back part of Pennsylvania, 300 miles from Philadelphia, which told me all that was likely to happen, and all that has now come, and is coming, to pass, as to the American States with regard to England.—By and by I shall offer an observation or two upon the *reasons the Americans have for going to war*, and upon the *probable consequences of such war*, if it should take place. At present, I shall as to this point, only repeat my opi-

nion, that it will take place, unless the Orders in Council be repealed: and also my opinion, that these orders will be repealed; and, that, too, without any of the *saving* conditions, of which the half-horned Courier is so silly as to talk. It will mortify some people, but it will be done. It will make those Jacobins and Levellers in America laugh, and Mr. Madison more, perhaps, than any body else; but I say, it will be done. Buonaparté will laugh too; but it will be done; and, perhaps, the least mortifying circumstance will not be, that *it is what I recommended fifteen months ago*. How much better would it have been, if it had been done *then*! How much better in every respect; and especially how much better for our character! However, better late than never; only when it is done, I hope it will be done with as good a grace as possible, and that after that, the venal prints in London will never more *foretell the downfall of Mr. Madison*, and will see the folly of venting their spleen in words, against those who are beyond our reach; of showing the teeth, where one cannot bite.—I cannot conclude this part of my observations without taking some notice of the attacks which have been made upon the *tone* of the American Manifesto. For my part, I thought it one of the best public papers I ever read. The Congress complain of what *they deem* monstrous outrages upon the property and character of their country, and their tone was, of course, to correspond with the nature of their complaint. But, our venal writers really seem to suppose, that the press in America is to be as tame and as slavish as theirs; they seem to look upon all the world as subject to what their poor, subdued, humbled, degraded press is subject to; I dare say, they long to see this Committee of Congress set on upon, ruined, and torn to pieces; and they seem ready to tear themselves to pieces, because the objects of their vengeance are beyond their reach. I have laughed heartily at the plaintive comments of the Times, and that others, particularly the Americans, may laugh too, I will here give a specimen of those comments.—“If the Committee gave the subject, as they say, a dispassionate consideration, it is incomprehensibly singular, that they could not find expressions, too, somewhat more dispassionate than the following, and many others:—““If we have not rushed to the field of battle, like the nations who are led by

“the mad ambition of a single Chief, or the
 “avarice of a corrupted Court, it has not
 “proceeded from a fear of war, but from
 “our love of justice and humanity.”
 “Now, in the first instance, to say, in less
 “turgid language, that they have only
 “been prevented from going to war by
 “their love of justice; or, in other words,
 “that they have only not gone to war, be-
 “cause they had no just cause to go to
 “war about, is not saying much in favour
 “of their humanity: and, in the next,
 “our Court may be *corrupt* enough; but
 “that corruption is, at least, if nothing
 “else is the result of *municipal regulations*
 “among ourselves; and therefore, forms no
 “part of a dispassionate enquiry upon fo-
 “reign affairs, by a committee of the Ame-
 “rican Congress.”—The cap, it seems,
 in the opinion of this writer, fits our own
 government. But, why should he give
 this application to the words of the Com-
 mittee? They name no particular court;
 there are other courts in the world, and
 courts, too, that have often rushed to war.
 Why, then, should he suppose that the
 Congress must necessarily have meant
 our court? It is very hard if no one can
 name *corruption* without our making the
 application to ourselves. Really people
 must take care how they make use of the
 word corruption even in figures of rheto-
 ric.—But, suppose the Committee had
 our government in their eye, as this writer
 assumes them to have had, were they not
 competent to designate it as corrupt, if
 they thought it so? Had they not a right
 to do it? Or, if they had not, what are
 we to think of the charges, which we daily
 see preferred against the government and
 court of France by these same writers?
 Is there a name, is there a set of epithets
 and terms, expressive of what is base,
 cruel, and infamous, that they have not
 bestowed upon Buonaparté and his Em-
 press? And, does Mr. Foster spare him
 in his letters? Is there much of what is
 wicked in a ruler of a nation that he has
 not liberally ascribed to the ruler of
 France, for libelling whom in England, a
 man was prosecuted by the Attorney Ge-
 neral, now our prime minister? The
 American Congress had, surely, as good
 a right to express their sentiments of our
 court (supposing them to have meant it)
 as Mr. Foster had to express his senti-
 ments of Buonaparté. But, besides, the
 Committee of Congress were not address-
 ing themselves to our government, but to
 the House, or, at most, to their own con-

stituents; and, would our venal tribe per-
 vent them from doing that? Would they
 prevent the Congress of America from
 speaking freely to the people? Would
 they muzzle them? Would they stifle
 truth in that hemisphere too? Thank
 God they cannot! Thank God the press
 there is beyond their reach! Thank God,
 that there men may now speak their
 minds in safety! During the whole of Mr.
 Madison's administration, there has not,
 in the whole country, been a prosecution
 for libel.—It is, to be sure, very decent
 in these venal writers to find fault of the
 tone of the American Manifesto, after all
 that they have said of Mr. Madison.
 They have called him every thing but a
 gentleman. They have abused him in
 the foulest of terms; they have, almost in
 the very words, called him both fool and
 knave. They have called him the *tool of*
Buonaparté; they have accused him of
 betraying the interests of his country in
 order to aid the views of France; and yet
 have they the impudence to complain
 that the Congress makes use of the word
corrupted, because by *possibility*, it may
 have been meant as applicable to our go-
 vernment! But, this impudence will only
 serve to excite a laugh with those, who
 have made use of the word; or, if it have
 any other effect, it will be that of induc-
 ing them to repeat the word more fre-
 quently than they would otherwise have
 done.—Let us now turn to what has
 passed in *parliament* upon the subject of
 America. Upon the report of the *Address*
 as amended by Lord Jocelyn, on the 8th
 instant, Mr. Whitbread complained of the
 conduct of our government towards Ame-
 rica. He was answered by Mr. Perce-
 val; who seemed to fight rather *shy*; but
 who said, respecting the repeal of the Or-
 ders in Council, nearly what has been said
 before by our diplomatic agents. That
 part of his speech, however, which I
 think worthy of particular notice, and the
 only part that I think of any consequence,
 is that, which relates to the *consequences of*
war between the two countries; and which,
 as reported, contained the following
 words:—“The true policy for this
 “country to adopt towards America, and
 “the policy which had been adhered to
 “by the Ministers of the Crown, was to
 “*stave-off* that catastrophe (the catas-
 “trophe of war) which it was the inte-
 “rest of both nations to avoid. The con-
 “duct of the Government to America
 “ought to be temperate and moderate,

“but at the same time, dignified and consistent; but nothing could impede its plans and progress more than, during the pending negotiations, to be thus putting it upon its defence; to be thus putting *the country upon its trial*. If the conduct of America was really that of a fair impartial neutrality, as the honourable gentleman contended, he would rather give the honourable gentleman credit for his opinion, than run the risk of endangering the success of the pending discussions, by any declaration to the contrary. A war between this country and America would be productive of evil to both; although, in his opinion, *not of so much evil to England as to America*. So far from considering the interests of both countries to be in any opposition to one another, he would always consider the wealth of America *as accessory to the riches, and her prosperity as accessory to the greatness of England*. He would, indeed, be sorry to see America *crushed, impoverished, or destroyed*. (Here Mr. Whitbread sneeringly repeated the word *destroyed*.) The Honourable Gentleman might repeat his words, but though he did not use the word *destroyed* in the sense of a physical annihilation, yet he contended that a war with England would prove destructive to America, destructive to her *wealth, her strength, her prosperity, and her progressive civilization*. The hon. gentleman reviled the phrase of conciliatory disposition, which the Regent's speech attributed to the English Government in its transactions with America. For his part, he was candid enough to confess, that he would bear with more from America than from any other foreign country with whom England could have any relations. His opinion on this point might be erroneous; but he was confident that he possessed towards America the fullest spirit of conciliation.”—This speech tends to confirm me in the opinion, that our ministers are preparing to *give way*; that is to say, that, after some further delay, they will repeal the Orders in Council, upon the ground, that they have, at last, got *satisfactory* intelligence, that the French Decrees are actually repealed.—But, Mr. Perceval makes a wrong estimate of our power to do harm to America. We have not the power that he supposes; we have not the power to injure her a tenth part so much as she has to injure us. There was a time, when we could have done her great

injury: that time is passed; and, if war would not create *an army* in America, it would be greatly to her advantage to have war with us; because it would render her wholly independent of us *for ever*; and would totally extinguish the English party in the United States. I shall, with great sorrow, see any thing like a *standing army* in America. That is the great danger to that country. The Congress, indeed, seem to be providing against the evil by giving the soldiers a bounty in *land*, and by making the term of enlistment for only *three years*; but, still I hate to see any thing in the shape of a regular military force rising up in that country. —This evil out of the question, the real solid interests of America point to a state of warfare against England, unless the Orders in Council be repealed.—We have heard much talk about the enforcing and repealing of these Orders; but, does the reader really know how they *operate* against America? I will tell him.—An American ship, owned by an American Citizen, commanded and manned by American Citizens, and laden with American rice or tobacco or flour or pork or any other produce of the country; such a ship, so owned and manned and laden, and bound to France, Holland, Italy, or any country under the dominion or influence of Napoleon, is met by one of our ships of war upon the seas. We send a prize-master and some sailors on board of her; take out the greater part of her hands; send her into one of our own ports; condemn and sell ship and cargo; and send the master, and any of his people that we have left in the ship, *adrift* without giving them any part of the worth of the cargo, leaving them *to find their way to America*, if they can, or to take their chance in the wide world. This takes place in any of the ports of England as it may happen; in Nova Scotia; in the West Indies; and, indeed, any where where we have ports. —The seizure is made upon any part of the seas; sometimes in the Channel, or upon the coast of France; and sometimes upon the coasts of America; and, it takes place with regard to vessels and cargoes going *from* as well as *to* France and her dependencies.—The American sailors that are taken out of these ships and brought on board our ships of war which make the capture, are obliged to remain on board of that ship of war, 'till it suits her convenience to send them on shore, which, perhaps, may not be for many

months; for, she may be going out to the East or West Indies or the Mediterranean, when she makes the capture.—Now, if the reader will, for a moment, imagine himself the *owner*, or *master*, or *one of the seamen*, in any of these cases, he will want nothing further to enable him to judge of what must be the feeling created in America by these Orders in Council; he will want nothing further to enable him to judge, whether it be or be not likely, that the American Congress are in earnest in their war-like language.—What is America to *lose* by war? Her *commerce*? Can she be said to have commerce, or, at least, *pacific* commerce, while our Orders are in force? She does, indeed, trade with France even now; but, she only does it in those cases where she has the good fortune not to be seen by our vessels; and, she would, of course, do the same *in war*. We now capture and condemn all her vessels trading with the continent of Europe, except just that spot or two where France does not command; and how much *more* could we do in war? Very little, therefore, would she lose by war, as far as relates to her commerce.—What would she lose in any other way? Norfolk, they say, we might *knock down*; and, I think, *New York*. But, would this "*destroy*" a nation of now about *ten millions of people*? No; but it would do something else; it would not leave a single man in America who would ever again think of opening his lips in favour of England. Could we *invade* any part of their territory? All the world knows, that we could not; we have no troops to spare; and, as to hiring *Germans*, as we did in the American war, we have *other uses* for all that we can get of them. What, then, are we to do to her? How is war to be an *evil* to her? What could she, in any way, *lose* by openly declared war; except, as I said before, from the necessity of creating a regular military force?—And what should we lose by it? In the first place all the additional expence necessary for the keeping up of stronger fleets in the neighbourhood of America; and, we might lose Canada, thought, perhaps, some persons might think that *a gain*. But, America would be able to do something against *our commerce*. She has no fleet; but, she has the means of sending forth numerous *Privateers*; and, they, as we now feel from those of France, would be able to do much. Those Privateers would make it necessary to guard our West India ships with convoys. Those Privateers would find a se-

cure retreat in all the ports of France and Holland; and, in a short time, the French ships of war would be filled with American seamen. In this way the war might be, and would be, most destructive to us. And, as to our connection with America, it would, at once, be cut off for ever; and thus would the *continental system* be not only established, but perpetuated, in America, as well as in Europe.—It appears to me, that a war with America, at this time, would have a most powerful tendency to promote the views of Napoleon against this country; and, therefore, I deprecate a war with America.—But, there is only one way of avoiding it; and that is, *repealing the Orders in Council*. Mr. Perceval may talk as long as he pleases about *want of proof* of the repeal of the French Decrees. He will receive no *new proof*, I am pretty sure. The Congress appear to be perfectly prepared for war; and, I do not think, that they will put up with much longer delay, before they resort to it. The first acts of hostility will probably take place with their *armed merchant ships*; but, it is little matter how they *begin*, if they are to have any continuance.—Mr. Perceval's notion that we could, by war, *impoverish* America; that we could give a check to her *civilization*; that we could *ruin* her; this notion will make the people in America laugh. They would wonder how any man could entertain it. They will ask, whether a war with us would blight their crops, or prevent their rivers from flowing; and as they hear him and his colleagues boast of the *increasing* prosperity and happiness of the people of England, under a twenty year's war, they will naturally asking him, why war should be so very fatal to the people of America; why *they* should be *ruined* by a few years of war. They will say, that England has been at war against *France* for a long time, and that France is notoriously richer and more powerful than ever; and, why, then will they ask, should we be so completely ruined by a war with England? And, as to civilization, they will naturally ask, where Mr. Perceval has found any proofs of their standing in need of *further* civilization? Whether he has discovered it in the correspondence between their and our ministers and secretaries. The venal writers in London did, indeed, discover, that the President's Speech was so barbarous, that it was to be compared to the language of the Wabash or Shawanese savages; but, the Americans may be of

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opinion, that it was full as correct and dignified as any Speech that was ever written even by Mr. Perceval himself.—Oh, no! The Americans will have no apprehensions of being *impoverished* or *destroyed*. They feel their strength; and I repeat it as my decided opinion, that they are prepared to try it. They will not wait to see what effect their declarations will produce here. They have *not time* to wait. The Congress will separate in March; and *to the Congress it belongs to declare war*. If, therefore, our minister in America be not instructed to announce the repeal of the Orders in Council before the end of March, my opinion is, that we shall have war with America.—A war with England would be favourable to another great object which the United States *must* have deeply at heart: namely, the *independence of South America*, which perhaps, the United States could not openly assist, while they kept any terms with us.—This is another powerful reason for their not yielding; and, for my part, I think I see in the Report of the Committee of Congress, a determination not to rest satisfied unless we give up the practice of *taking men out of their vessels upon the high seas*. This appears very plain to me. The impressment of their seamen is the point upon which the American *people* were always the most alive. The American government has always made this a ground of complaint; and, having once *armed*, they will make it a ground of war, rather than give it up.—This, they think, is their time. They see how we are beset. They know our state as well as Mr. Perceval or Sir Francis Burdett. They see what a sort of a war we are able to carry on in the peninsula. They foresee pretty exactly the result of that war; or, at least, *they know its wants*. They have their eyes upon Sicily too; and, in short, they know precisely what a situation we are in; and they will stare when they see a speech of an English minister, in which their *ruin* is predicted from *a war with England*.

SPAIN.—In a military point of view, this country continues in nearly the same state as when I last noticed it; except that the Guerillas, or Bands, seem to have been nearly all dispersed; and that great progress seems to have been made in the siege of Valencia.—I have paid a good deal of attention to the matter; and, with a strong desire to come at the truth, I

really can see no part of Spain, except the city of Valencia and the Isle of Leon, which is not in the hands of the French. —But, though there is very little new as far as relates to the military affairs of Spain, there has something come to light, respecting the disputes between the Spanish Government and our Ambassador, which is of great interest. The grounds of this dispute have now been openly avowed and detailed by our hireling writers, who have stated them to be as follows. “1st. That General Lapena has not only been “acquitted of all blame, but has been “decorated with an order of rank for his “able conduct at the battle of Barrosa. “2d. That Imaz, the man who gave up “Badajos to the French, is still at large. “3d. That the arms and equipments supplied by England for the deliverance of “the Peninsula, have been sent out of the “country, and employed against the insurgents in South America. 4th. That “the Spanish ships repaired by England, “have been employed to transport Spanish “troops to the same quarter. And 5th. “That the Spanish Government rejected “for a long time our offers to mediate “between European and transatlantic “Spain.”—From the moment, that we saw what took place here upon the receipt of General Graham’s dispatch, relating to the battle of Barrosa, we might easily have foreseen, that ill-blood, and, finally open disputes would be the consequence.—Such a result was so natural! For, where is there a people upon the earth, who could have borne the language that was then made use of, in *Speeches* as well as in paragraphs? In some of the Speeches in Parliament, and in the Common Council of London, it was enough to extol General Graham to the skies, without speaking in terms of a directly opposite tendency of the *Spanish Officers*; and, though I must say, that the Ministers did abstain from all abuse of the Spanish Officers, yet, they were far from speaking in their *defence*; while the newspapers made no scruple to cail them either *cowards* or *traitors*, and to demand their heads as the price of their cowardice or treason. This was not *prudent*; and, what is more, it was *unjust*; because, there was no *proof* of the misconduct of the Spanish Officers; nor, indeed, did we see any *charge* distinctly preferred against them? and, therefore, for men to hear themselves condemned as *cowards* or *traitors* without proof and without formal charge, was

enough to excite not only in their breasts, but in that of their friends, a great deal of indignation and resentment.—Besides, had the Spaniards never seen how our government acts in cases of the failure of military enterprises? Had they not read the king's answer to the City of London in the cases of the *Cintra Convention* and the *Expedition to Walcheren*? Had they not heard of our other military expeditions; and did they hear the leaders accused of *cowardice* or *treason*? Why, then, they would justly ask, were they to be so hastily, and quite unheard, condemned to the gallows, or to everlasting infamy, by our orators and writers?—At the time when this out-cry was going on in England, I said something about it myself; and, a very modest and sensible letter was sent me, in defence of the Spanish Officers, which I inserted in the Register. This brought me a packet from one of those officers, accompanied with a letter in these words:—"Sir, "You must not be surprised that a man "who is a victim of envy and invidiousness "should have recourse to the talents and "virtue of a person, who is a constant advocate for truth, and who is endowed "with the singular gift of making it "known to every class of people. Induced by this consideration, I take the "liberty of sending you a reply, which, "in a great measure, will make you acquainted with the true and real occurrences of the battle of the 5th of March "last, fought on the fields of Chiclana. "I have observed, in one of your numbers, "that this affair has attracted your attention, and I send you this reply, that you "may use it as you deem convenient. I "embrace this occasion to assure you, that I "rank amongst the first of your admirers."—The reader will suppose, that I was very much flattered with this communication; but, I had not at hand the means of having the *Reply* translated. It has been translated, since, and published; and a very masterly production it is. I have seldom read any thing so ably written; and, if the facts are true, the reasoning is quite conclusive.—At any rate, there was *something* to be said in defence of the Spanish Officers; and, they were condemned here, *before that defence was heard*. It was not only what Sir Francis Burdett calls an "anticipation of *guilt* before hearing the evidence in defence;" but, it was actually pronouncing *judgment* before hearing that evidence.—The Morning

Chronicle behaved most foully in this business. It published a Letter of General Graham, purporting to be an *answer* to a Letter of General Lapena; and it did *not publish* the Letter of General Lapena! This was so unfair; it was such foul treatment of a man, who had no means of self-defence here, and whose own government was so dependent upon us, that it was quite sickening to think of it. I grudged General Graham no praise that was his due. I thought the thanks of the City of London too much for an action such as that which was ascribed to him; but, I was glad to hear, as I always am, that our soldiers give proof of valour. I thought it quite ridiculous when I saw it stated in our news-papers, that the Prince Regent had written to General Graham *with his own hand*, that he would make him a *peer* as soon as the restrictions were taken off from his authority as Regent; but, I was heartily disposed to find ground of praise for General Graham and his troops. Yet, at the same time, my mind did, I must confess, revolt at the idea of building their fame upon the ruin of that of the Spanish General and his officers; and the more so as the Spanish officers seemed to me to be unprotected, their government being necessarily so much dependent upon the will of our government.—The Spanish government have, nevertheless, had the courage to do what they appear to think justice in this case. General Lapena has been *tried*, his trial has produced not only his acquittal, but a *new mark of honour* bestowed on him for his conduct at Chiclana; aye, for that very conduct, on account of which our news-papers, with voice almost unanimous, condemned him as worthy of death!—One can hardly believe it possible, that our Ambassador should have *taken offence* at this decision of the Spanish government about General Lapena; and that it should have become a ground of complaint. Yet, it is so stated in our public prints; and that another ground of complaint is, that GENERAL IMAZ, who surrendered Badajoz to the French, has not been brought to a court-martial. This can never be; or, at least, one would think so. It is so manifestly destructive of all chance of preserving harmony with the Spanish government, and of all chance of our effecting any thing against the French in Spain; it tends so directly to drive into the interest of the French even those Spaniards that remain attached to us, that one cannot believe it without better

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authority. It would be, indeed, a pretty sort of *independence* that the Spaniards would enjoy, if they were *not suffered to decide upon the conduct of their own military officers*. This would indeed, be a sort of *independence* for which to shed rivers of blood.—Another ground of dispute, or rather, another complaint, is said to be, that the government of Spain refuses to accept of *our mediation* between Spain and her colonies. This is, if possible, more incredible than the two former; for, what business have we to interfere between the parties? We profess to wish to defend Spain against Buonaparté. He has nothing to do in the *colonies* of Spain. It is for Spain to do what she pleases about her colonies. She is the best judge of what measures to adopt with regard to them; or, if she be not, we have no right to interfere.—As to the other two complaints about the ships and the military stores, one must know the real state of the case before one can judge; but, this we may venture to say, that, if such things be really urged in the way of *complaint*, harmony is no more between our government and that of Spain.—That these complaints have been made cannot, I think, be believed; but, yet, there is certainly some misunderstanding. That misunderstanding will not be done away by the successes of the French. Those successes are calculated to have a contrary effect; and, if any attempt be made to set aside the Cortes or the Regency, the thing is over as once. Our news-papers already talk of certain *Galicized* Spanish journals published at Cadiz; they plainly tell us, that there are French emissaries and a *French party* actually in that city. This is a sad foreboding; for, this has been the cry in all the cases where we have finally been compelled to quit any of the numerous countries, which we have endeavoured to *deliver*.—If once there takes place an open rupture between us and the Spanish government, the members of that government have but one possible course left; and yet, we hear some of our writers suggesting, that it may be *necessary to make some change* in the constituted authorities. Ah! say you so? But, who is to be the maker of this change? Not *we*, I hope? And, yet, why talk of it, if this be not meant? It is, one would think, rather dangerous to talk in this way; but what is too bold for these men who have the *free press* of London in their hands? If we had the power of making and unmaking

the government in Spain, the *independence* of that country would be a thing so sublime as not to be looked at with the naked eye.—The month of May next will probably shew us what we have to expect with regard to Spain. If Valencia fall, the conquest seems to be complete, with the exception of the Isle of Leon, which being besieged, will require an army to watch it; but, there will be a great force to spare for Portugal, and then we shall see movements worth notice.—Mr. Whitbread seems to have been a good deal cut down by the Minister, who caught him again at his *desponding prophecies*, after having retracted them so candidly once before. The little sharp Minister told him, that Buonaparté had been kept out of Portugal; which was very true; and, the Minister was prudent enough not to predict *how long* Buonaparté would be kept out of Portugal. This was acting a very wise part; for, indeed, no man can count the years, no, nor the hours. I have often been thinking of the streight that we should be in, if the war in Spain and Portugal were at an end; where we should look out for countries to *deliver*. But, as the Yankees say, it is time enough to jump over that ditch when we come to it.

PRICE OF BREAD.—Several applications having been made to me for explanations as to the mode of using the *Rice*, mentioned in my last number, I will now give it. The rice is put into about four times its weight in *cold water*, and then *boiled* in that water, till it becomes a perfect pulp. It is then mixed with a little flour, and the yeast necessary for the quantity of bread, and a little more salt than is usually made use of. Then the rest of the flour is kneaded into it, in order to make it into dough, about 3 ounces more of which than of common dough ought to be put into a quarten loaf, in order to keep the quarten loaf up to its proper weight.—A correspondent, in consequence of the article on this subject, in my last number, is pleased to be a little sarcastic. He says: "I fear, that wheat and flour will still rise in price, notwithstanding the exertions of Messrs. Cobbett, Timothy Brown, and Co. to keep it down by mixing rice with flour. Perhaps these *wiseacres* do not know how far they are out-done in their charitable exertions by every petty Miller and Baker in the country, who have been beforehand

“with them, by mixing with wheat, not only rice, but *beans* and *peas* and every wholesome and unwholesome ingredient that they have been able to discover; so that, by next harvest, we shall have swabbed the decks, not only of grain and pulse, but of every thing eatable for man and beast; and shall have reduced even the Hanover Rats (as the old people call them), adroit as they are in the work of plunder, to a state of starvation.”—Now, in the first place, this correspondent thinks proper to overlook the circumstance of my having expressly observed, that it was not expected, that the use of rice, in this way, *would add to the quantity of food in the country*, seeing that all the food would be eaten in one shape or another; and, of course, it was not expected, that the use of rice, in the shape of bread, would *keep down* the price of wheat and flour. The fact I stated applied only to *particular instances*; and, it was, or might be, useful to know, that rice was *capable* of being so used; because, though no positive addition could thereby be made to the quantity of food in the country, the *quality* might be improved, and would be improved, if it was found, that rice in the shape of bread and mixed with wheat flour, was more nutritious than when used alone. I am neither cook nor baker, and I do not know, that there would be much harm if there were none of either trade in the world; but, I well know, that things, which are good for nothing *separately* became very good by being mixed. Chalk alone will not bear a blade of any thing, but, how wonderfully productive does it become by being mixed with clay! Sheer Sand and Carrion Clay will bear nothing when each is by itself; but mingle them, and you will have very fine crops. Why does not a man, who has a mud heap, sow his corn upon it, instead of tearing his horses and tackle to pieces in carrying it upon his land? Why, because, however little gifted he may be as a philosopher, he knows, that the mud, when mixed with his common soil, will be the cause of more produce; or, in other words, that it will *be better*. And why, I should be glad to know, should not a similar, or, at least, somewhat similar, improvement, take place in consequence of a mixture of wheat flour and rice?—As to the practices of the Millers and Bakers, my correspondent appears to be perfectly well, I should almost be inclined to say *too well*, acquainted with them. But, there seems

through the whole of his letter such manifest signs of enmity towards any thing that may tend to keep down the price of wheat, that I cannot help suspecting him to be a possessor of not a few ricks and mows of that grain. I will engage, that he is not one of those who wish to see sugar used in the distilleries. I will put these two questions to him, and I call upon him for conscientious answers: Have you, Sir, during the last twenty years, ever repeated *the Prayer for Plenty*? Have you, every day within the last four months, prayed most devoutly for the *closing of the Baltic and for an American Embargo*? If he can answer the first of these questions in the affirmative and the latter in the negative, I will then say, that his sarcasms upon us rice-bakers may proceed from his conviction of the inutility of our endeavours. But, at present, I do suspect, that he is (though perhaps, with very little cause) afraid, that those endeavours tend to diminution of his own gains.—There are divers reasons why we should wish to see corn at a reasonable price, and even cheap, that is to say, plenty; at the head of which reasons certainly is, that the poor are then more happy and contented, and less liable to commit desperate acts against our happy constitution; but, another is, that the *farmers* are then better off, if the being more sober and modest be an improvement. Of all two-legged creatures none are so different from each other as a *dear-corn* farmer and a *cheap-corn* farmer. The former swears at waiters and drinks wine like a lord; the latter walks meekly into the tap-room, and in a piping voice, calls for “a pint of your nice beer, land-lady, if you please!” The former spansks to and from market upon a horse that flings the dirt in the face and puts to hazard the limbs of the foot passenger; the latter jogs along upon an old breeding mare, unfit for the team, pulls off his hat to his betters, and kindly bids “good day” to the very beggar on the road. The former draws himself out in all the gear of the day, has a pocketless coat, a waistcoat about a hand deep, throws his belly into his breeches, and pads up his neck till it is equal to a gallon measure in girth, seeming to consider as an ornament what was originally intended to hide the marks of a loathsome disease; the neck of the latter is distinguishable from the unpadded shoulders, while his body, ending at his hips, is covered by a vest and a coat, calculated for convenience and warmth.

The former, drunk over-night, lies in bed 'till noon; the latter rises with the lark. The former tricks out his daughters with forte pianos; the latter puts them to the churn or spinning wheel, the music of either of which is, by the bye, far better than that of the piano, because that of neither is nearly so loud. The dear-corn farmer seldom goes to church; the cheap-corn farmer is always remarkably regular in his devotions, penury being, like pain, a great promoter of religion.—The sarcastic letter of my correspondent smacks strongly of the times. When horses are unruly, it is a saying, that the *oats prick* them. Dear corn seems to have a similar effect upon their masters. In wishing that wheat may be fifteen pounds a load, I, in fact, wish for the reformation and happiness of my correspondent; and, in whatever degree the converting of rice into bread shall tend to the lowering of the price of wheat, in that same degree, am I endeavouring to produce the accomplishment of this friendly wish.—Thus far in amity; but, there are bounds to all things; there is a measure for endurance as well as for every thing else; and, if this gentleman meant to "*pain my feelings*," he should be taught that that is a *crime*, and a crime, too, punishable by fine and imprisonment. He may know how to *tackle* crow-peck or couch grass; he may know how to cure the foot-rot in sheep, or to poison Hanover Rats; but, an Ex-Officio Information, once well stuck upon him, would, I imagine, leave him very little disposition to indulge in sarcasms about the use of rice. If he will listen to *reason* it is well; but, if he will not, we will show him, that there is another way to answer him.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
17th January, 1812.*

AMERICAN STATES.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.

Mr. Pinkney to Lord Wellesley. Great Cumberland-place, Jan. 14, 1811.

(*Concluded from p. 64.*)

it would fain induce you to acknowledge, but could not prevail upon itself to avow, I am not able to conjecture.—The frank and honourable character of the American Government justifies me in saying, that if it had meant to demand of Great Britain an abjuration of all such principles as the French Government may think fit to dis-

approve, it would not have put your lordship to the trouble of discovering that meaning by the aid of combinations and inferences discountenanced by the language of its minister, but would have told you so in explicit terms. What I have to request of your Lordship, therefore, is, that you will take our views and principles from our own mouths; and that neither the Berlin decree, nor any other act of any foreign State, may be made to speak for us what we have not spoken for ourselves.—The principles of blockade which the American Government professes, and upon the foundation of which it has repeatedly protested against the Order of May, 1806, and the other kindred innovations of these extraordinary times, have already been so clearly explained to your Lordship, in my letter of the 21st of September, that it is hardly possible to read that letter and misunderstand them. Recommended by the plainest considerations of universal equity, you will find them supported with a strength of argument and a weight of authority, of which they scarcely stand in need, in the papers which will accompany this letter, or were transmitted in that of September. I will not recapitulate what I cannot improve; but I must avail myself of this opportunity, to call your lordships attention a second time, in a particular manner, to one of the papers to which my letter of September refers. I allude to the copy of an official note, of the 12th of April, 1804, from Mr. Merry to Mr. Madison, respecting a pretended blockade of Martinique and Guadeloupe. No comment can add to the value of that manly and perspicuous exposition of the law of blockade, as made by England herself in maintenance of rules, which have been respected and upheld, in all seasons, and on all occasions, by the Government of the United States. I will leave it therefore to your Lordship's consideration, with only this remark, that, while that paper exists it would be superfluous to seek, in any French document, or the opinions of the American Government, and of the matter of it.—The steady fidelity of the government of the United States to its opinions on that interesting subject is known to every body. The same principles which are found in the letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Thornton, of the 27th of October 1803, already before you, were asserted in 1799, by the American Minister at this Court, in his correspondence with Lord Grenville, re-

specting the blockade of some of the ports of Holland; were sanctioned, in a letter of the 20th of September, 1800, from the Secretary of State of the United States to Mr. King, of which an extract is enclosed; were insisted upon in repeated instructions to Mr. Monroe, and the special mission of 1806; have been maintained by the United States against others, as well as against England, as will appear by the inclosed copy of instructions, dated the 21st of October 1801, from Mr. Secretary Madison to Mr. Charles Pinkney, then American Minister at Madrid; and finally were adhered to by the United States when belligerent, in the case of the blockade of Tripoli.—A few words will give a summary of those principles; and when recalled to your remembrance. I am not without hopes that the strong grounds of law and right on which they stand will be as apparent to your lordship as they are to me.—It is by no means clear that it may not fairly be contended, on principle and early usage, that a maritime blockade is incomplete with regard to states at peace, unless the place which it would affect is invested by land as well as by sea. The United States, however, have called for the recognition of no such rule. They appear to have contented themselves with urging in substance, that ports not actually blockaded by a present, adequate, stationary force, employed by the power which attacks them, shall not be considered as shut to neutral trade in articles not contraband of war; that, though it is usual for a belligerent to give notice to neutral nations when he intends to institute a blockade, it is possible that he may not act upon his intention at all, or that he may execute it insufficiently, or that he may discontinue his blockade, of which it is not customary to give any notice; that, consequently the presence of the blockading force is the natural criterion by which the neutral is enabled to ascertain the existence of the blockade at any given period. In like manner as the actual investment of a besieged place is the evidence by which we decide whether the siege, which may be commenced, raised, recommenced, and raised again, is continued or not; that, of course, a mere notification to a neutral minister shall not be relied upon, as affecting, with knowledge of the actual existence of the blockade, either his government or its citizens; that a vessel, cleared or bound to a blockaded port, shall not be considered as violating,

in any manner, the blockade, unless on her approach towards such port, she shall have been previously warned not to enter it; that this view of the law, in itself perfectly correct, is peculiarly important to nations situated at a great distance from the belligerent parties, and, therefore, incapable of obtaining other than tardy information of the actual state of their ports: that whole coasts and countries shall not be declared (for they can never be more than declared) to be in a state of blockade, converted into the means of extinguishing the trade of neutral nations; and, lastly, that every blockade should be impartial in its operation, or, in other words, shall not open and shut for the convenience of the party that institutes it, and at the same time repel the commerce of the rest of the world, so as to become the odious instrument of an unjust monopoly, instead of a measure of honourable war.—These principles are too moderate and just to furnish any motive to the British Government for hesitating to revoke its Orders in Council, and those analogous orders of blockade which the United States expect to be recalled. It can hardly be doubted that Great Britain will ultimately accede to them in their fullest extent; but if that be a sanguine calculation (as I trust it is not), it is still incontrovertible, that a disinclination at this moment to acknowledge them can suggest no rational inducement for declining to repeal at once what every principle disowns, and what must be repealed at last.—With regard to the rules of blockade which the French Government expects you to abandon, I do not take upon me to decide whether they are such as your Lordship supposes them to be or not. Your view of them may be correct, but it may also be erroneous; and it is wholly immaterial to the case between the United States and Great Britain, whether it be the one or the other.—As to such British blockades as the United States desire you to relinquish, you will not, I am sure, allege, that it is any reason for adhering to them, that France expects you to relinquish others. If our demands are suited to the measure of our own rights, and of your obligations as they respect those rights, you cannot think of founding a rejection of them upon any imputed exorbitance in theories of the French Government, for which we are not responsible, and with which we have no concern. If, when you have done justice to the United States, your enemy should call upon you

to go farther, what shall prevent you from refusing? Your free agency will in no respect have been impaired. Your case will be better in truth, and in the opinion of mankind—and you will be, therefore, stronger in maintaining it; provided that, in doing so, you resort only to legitimate means, and do not once more forget the rights of others, while you seek to vindicate your own. Whether France will be satisfied with what you may do, is not to be known by anticipation, and ought not to be a subject of enquiry.—So vague a speculation has nothing to do with your duties to nations at peace—and if it had, would annihilate them. It cannot serve your interests; for it tends to lessen the number of your friends, without tending to your security against your enemies. You are required, therefore, to do right, and to leave the consequences to the future, when by doing right, you have every thing to gain, and nothing to lose.—As to the Orders in Council, which professed to be a reluctant departure from all ordinary rules, and to be justified only as a system of retaliation for a pre-existing measure of France, their foundation (such as it was) is gone the moment that measure is no longer in operation. But the Berlin Decree is repealed; and even the Milan Decree, the successor of your Orders in Council, is repealed also. Why is it, then, that your Orders have outlived those edicts, and that they are still to oppress and harass as before? Your Lordship answers this question explicitly enough, but not satisfactorily. You do not allege that the French Decrees are not repealed; but you imagine that the repeal is not to remain in force, unless the British Government shall, in addition to the revocation of its Orders in Council, abandon its system of blockade. I am not conscious of having stated, as your Lordship seems to think, that this is so; and I believe, in fact, that it is otherwise. Even if it were admitted, however, the Orders in Council ought, nevertheless, to be revoked. Can “the safety and honour of the British nation” demand, that these Orders shall continue to outrage the public law of the world, and sport with the undisputed rights of neutral commerce, after the pretext which was at first invented for them is gone? But you are menaced with a revival of the French system, and consequently may again be furnished with the same pretext. Be it so; yet still, as the system and the pretext are at present at an end, so of course should

be your orders.—According to your mode of reasoning, the situation of neutral trade is hopeless indeed. Whether the Berlin Decree exists or not, it is equally to justify your Orders in Council. You issued them before it was any thing but a shadow, and by doing so, gave to it all the substance it could ever claim. It is at this moment nothing. It is revoked, and has passed away, according to your own admission. You choose, however, to look for its reappearance; and you make your own expectation equivalent to the decree itself. Compelled to concede that there is no anti-neutral French edict in operation on the ocean, you think it sufficient to say that there will be such an edict you know not when; and in the mean time you do all you can to verify your own prediction, by giving to your enemy all the provocation in your power to resume the decrees which he has abandoned.—For my part, my Lord, I know not what it is that the British Government requires, with a view to what it calls its safety and its honour, as an inducement to rescind its Orders in Council. It does not, I presume, imagine that such a system will be suffered to ripen into law. It must intend to relinquish it sooner or later, as one of those violent experiments for which time can do nothing, and to which submission will be hoped in vain. Yet, even after the professed foundation of this mischievous system is taken away, another and another is industriously procured for it; so that no man can tell at what time, or under what circumstances, it is likely to have an end. When realities cannot be found, possibilities supply their place; and that which was originally said to be retaliation for actual injury, becomes at last (if such a solecism can be endured or imagined) retaliation for apprehended injuries, which the future may or may not produce, but which it is certain have no existence now.—I do not mean to grant, for I do not think, that the edict of Berlin did at any time lend even a colour of equity to the British Orders in Council with reference to the United States; but it might reasonably have been expected, that they who have so much relied upon it as a justification, would have suffered it and them to sink together. How this is forbidden by your safety, or your honour, remains to be explained; and I am not willing to believe, that either the one or the other is inconsistent with the observance of substantial justice, and with the prosperity and rights of peaceful

states. Although your Lordship has slightly remarked upon certain recent acts of the French Government, and has spoken in general terms of "the system of violence and injustice now pursued by France," as requiring "some precautions of defence on the part of Great Britain." I do not perceive that you deduce any consequence from these observations, in favour of a perseverance in the Orders in Council. I am not myself aware of any Edicts of France, which, now that the Berlin and Milan Decrees are repealed, affect the rights of neutral commerce on the seas: and you will yourselves admit, that if any of the Acts of the French Government, resting on territorial sovereignty, have injured, or shall hereafter injure the United States, it is for them, and for them only, to seek redress. In like manner it is for Great Britain to determine what precautions of defence those measures of France, which you denominate unjust and violent, may render it expedient for her to adopt. The United States have only to insist that a sacrifice of their rights shall not be among the number of these precautions.—In replying to that passage in your letter, which adverts to the American Act of Non-Inter-course, it is only necessary to mention the Proclamation of the President of the United States, of the 2d of November last, and the Act of Congress, which my letter of the 21st of September communicated; and to add, that it is in the power of the British Government to prevent the Non-Inter-course from being enforced against Great Britain.—Upon the concluding paragraph of your letter I will barely observe, that I am not in possession, of any document which you are likely to consider as authentic, shewing that the French decrees are "absolutely revoked upon the single condition of the revocation of the British Orders in Council;" but that the information which I have lately received from the American Legation at Paris confirms what I have already stated, and, I think, proved to your Lordship, that those Decrees are repealed, and have ceased to have any effect. I will now trespass on you no farther than to suggest, that it would have given me sincere pleasure to be enabled to say as much of the British Orders in Council, and of the blockades from which it is impossible to distinguish them. I have the honour to be, with great respect and consideration, my Lord, your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,—(Signed)—W. PINKNEY.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—*French Dispatches.*—*Marshal Count Suchet's Account of the Battle and Capture of Saguntum, 26 Oct. 1811.*
(Concluded from vol. 20, p. 768.)

.....All these works were executed on a naked rock, with infinite difficulty. All the parapets of the trenches were formed of sacks of earth, which were brought from a great distance, and it was necessary to raise them seven or eight feet, in order to protect our soldiers from the enemy's works, which commanded the position.—These works do much credit to the conductor of the attack, Henry, and to the Engineer Officers under his orders.—We lost several sappers in the execution of works so difficult and so near the enemy, both by musketry and by the grenades and stones thrown by the Spaniards.—On the 25th the artillery began firing from the new battery, at 70 toises distance from the work, and bombarded with success the tower of the out-work of St. Fernando.—In the morning, Gen. Blake advanced at the head of 30,000 men, to raise the siege; Marshal Suchet advanced to meet him, and gained a complete victory.—On the 26th, the breach was practicable for 20 men a-breast, and we were well established at the foot of it.—The Marshal summoned the garrison, which surrendered by capitulation.—The same day we entered the fortress, and became masters of a place which had so long braved the efforts of the Carthaginian General.—ROGNAT, General of Division of Engineers.—*From Murviedro, Oct. 28, 1811.*

PORTUGAL. THE WAR.—*Gazette Extraordinary, published 18 Nov. 1811.*

(Concluded from vol. 20, p. 672.)

..... A detachment of the army of the North which had crossed the Tormes with a view to plunder the country between that river and the Veltes, have returned to their cantonments without deriving much advantage from this expedition.—I have directed General Hill to endeavour to force Gerard's division of the 5th corps to retire from Caceres, as, in that position, they distress for provisions the troops under the Conde de Penne Villamur, and General Murillo, belonging to Gen. Castanos. Lieutenant-General Hill was to move from his cantonments on this expedition on the 22d.—By the accounts which I have received from Cadiz

to the 16th instant, I learn that Marshal Suchet had entered the kingdom of Valencia, from Tortosa, with twenty thousand men, and had advanced as far as Murviedro; he made three attempts to obtain possession of the fort of Sagunto, near that town, by escalade, on the 29th of last month, in all which he was repulsed with considerable loss, and left behind him his ladders. He was still at Murviedro on the 4th instant.—In the mean time General Blake had thrown himself into Valencia. All the strong holds of Valencia were occupied, and the greatest efforts were making to bring a large force into that kingdom, in order to annoy the enemy's communications with his rear. The utmost confidence appears by the accounts to be placed in General Blake; and the people of Valencia appear determined to co-operate in resistance to the enemy.—There has been no movement in the north since I last addressed your Lordship.

Freneda, Oct. 30.

The detachment of the army of the North, which was at Ledesma, moved from thence towards Salamanca on the 28th instant.—Excepting that movement, the troops of the Armies of the North and of Portugal have made none since I addressed you last.—The last report I received from General Hill was dated at Malpertida de Caceres, on the 26th. General Gerard retired from Caceres on that morning.—By the last accounts which I have received from Cadiz, of the 18th, it appears that General Ballasteros had retired under the guns of Gibraltar; and that the French were at St. Roque, and had taken possession of Algeiras.—I have received no further accounts from Valencia.—It appears from all the accounts which I have received, that the Guerillas are increasing in numbers and boldness throughout the Peninsula. One party under Temprano, lately retook at the very gates of Talavera, Lieutenant Col. Grant of the Portuguese service, who had been taken in the beginning of September in Upper Estremadura, while employed in observation of the enemy's movements. Both the Empecinado and Mina were very successful against some of the enemy's posts and detachments, when their armies were lately collected for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; and Longa was likewise very successful in the neighbourhood of Victoria, in the middle and towards the latter end of September.

PORTUGAL.—THE WAR.—*London Gazette Extraordinary.*—Downing Street, December 1, 1811.

Captain Hill, Aide-de-Camp to Lieutenant-General Hill, arrived this day at the Earl of Liverpool's Office, with a dispatch, addressed to his Lordship by General Viscount Wellington, dated Frenada, 6th of November, 1811, of which the following is an extract:—

I informed your Lordship, in my dispatches of the 23d and 30th of October, of the orders which I had given to Lieutenant-General Hill to move into Estremadura with the troops under his command, and with his progress to the 26th of October.—He marched on the 27th by Aldea del Cano to Alcuesca; and on the 28th, in the morning, surprized the enemy's troops under General Girard at Arroyo del Molino, and dispersed the division of infantry and cavalry which had been employed under the command of that General, taking General Brune, the Duc d'Aremberg, and about 1,300 prisoners, three pieces of cannon, &c. and having killed many in the action with the enemy, and in the subsequent pursuit. General Girard escaped, wounded; and by all accounts which I have received, General Dubrocoskie was killed.—I beg to refer your Lordship for the details of Lieutenant-General Hill's operations to the 30th of October, to his dispatch to me of that date from Merida, a copy of which I enclose. I have frequently had the pleasure to report to your Lordship the zeal and ability with which Lieutenant-Gen. Hill had carried into execution the operations entrusted to his charge; and I have great satisfaction in repeating my commendations of him, and of the brave troops under his command, upon the present occasion, in which the ability of the General, and the gallantry and discipline of the officers and troops, have been conspicuous.—I send with General Hill's dispatch a plan of the ground and of the operations on the 28th of October, by Captain Hill, the General's brother and Aide-de-camp, who attended him in the action, and will be able to give your Lordship any farther details which you may require. I beg leave to recommend him to your protection.

Merida, Oct. 30th, 1811.

My Lord;—In pursuance of the instructions which I received from your Lordship, I put a portion of the troops un-

der my orders in motion on the 22d instant, from their cantonments in the neighbourhood of Portalegre, and advanced with them towards the Spanish frontier.—On the 23d the head of the column reached Albuquerque, when I learnt that the enemy, who had advanced to Aliseda, had fallen back to Arroyo del Puerco, and that the Spaniards were again in possession of Aliseda.—On the 24th I had a brigade of British infantry, half a brigade of Portuguese artillery (six pounders), and some of my cavalry, at Aliseda; and the remainder of my cavalry, another brigade of British infantry, and half a brigade of Portuguese six-pounders, at Casa de Cantillana, about a league distant.—On the 25th, the Count de Penne Villamur made a reconnoissance with his cavalry, and drove the enemy from Arroyo del Puerco. The enemy retired to Malpartida, which place he occupied as an advanced post, with about 300 cavalry and some infantry, his main body being still at Cáceres.—On the 26th, at day-break, the troops arrived at Malpartida, and found that the enemy had left that place, retiring towards Cáceres, followed by a small party of the 2d hussars, who skirmished with his rear-guard. I was shortly afterwards informed, that the whole of the enemy's force had left Cáceres; but the want of certainty as to the direction he had taken, and the extreme badness of the weather, induced me to halt the Portuguese and British troops at Malpartida for that night. The Spaniards moved on to Cáceres.—Having received certain information, that the enemy had marched on Torre Mocha, I put the troops at Malpartida in motion, on the morning of the 27th, and advanced by the road leading to Merida, through Aldea del Cano, and Casa de Don Antonio, being a shorter route than that followed by the enemy, and which afforded a hope of being able to intercept and bring him to action; and I was here joined by the Spaniards from Cáceres. On the march, I received information, that the enemy had only left Torre Mocha that morning, and that he had again halted his main body at Arroyo del Molino, leaving a rear-guard at Albala, which was a satisfactory proof that he was ignorant of the movements of the troops under my command.—I therefore made a forced march to Alcues-

ca that evening, where the troops were so placed as to be out of sight of the enemy, and no fires were allowed to be made. On my arrival at Alcuesca, which is within a league of Arroyo del Molino, every thing tended to confirm me in my opinion that the enemy was not only in total ignorance of my near approach, but extremely off his guard; and I determined upon attempting to surprize, or at least, to bring him to action, before he should march in the morning; and the necessary dispositions were made for that purpose.—The town of Arroyo del Molino is situated at the foot of one extremity of the Sierra of Montanches; the mountain running from it to the rear, in the form of a crescent, almost every-where inaccessible, the two points being about two miles asunder. The Truxillo road runs round that to the eastward.—The road leading from the town to Merida runs at right angles with that from Alcuesca, and the road to Medellin passes between those to Truxillo and Merida. The ground over which the troops had to manœuvre being a plain, thinly scattered with oak and cork trees, my object of course was to place a body of troops so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy by any of these roads.—The troops moved from their bivouack near Alcuesca, about two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, in one column right in front, direct on Arroyo del Molino, and in the following order:—Major-General Howard's Brigade of infantry, (1st battalion 50th, 71st, and 92d regiments, and one company of the 60th,) Colonel Wilson's brigade (1st battalion 28th, 2d battalion 34th, and 2d battalion 39th, and one company of the 60th,) 6th Portuguese regiment of the line, and 6th Caçadores under Colonel Ashworth, the Spanish infantry under Brigadier-General Morillo, Major-General Long's brigade of Cavalry, (2d Hussar, 9th and 13th Light Dragoons,) and the Spanish cavalry under the Conde de Penne Villamur. They moved in this order until within half a mile of the town of Arroyo del Molino, when, under cover of a low ridge, the column closed, and divided into three columns. Major-General Howard's Brigade, and three six-pounders under Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, supported by Brigadier-General Morillo's infantry, the left;

(To be continued.)